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Civil Unrest and the Role of the
Attorney General: A Comparison of
Ramsey Clark to William Barr
by Lonnie T. Brown, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 25, 2020, a Minneapolis police officer killed George Floyd, a
Black man suspected of passing a counterfeit $20 bill, by kneeling on
his neck for a reported eight minutes and forty-six seconds, while two
other officers assisted in pinning him down.1 The entire shocking
episode was captured on video and repeatedly telecast throughout the
nation and world. The public’s angry reaction was swift and powerful.
Both in the United States and abroad, an unprecedented wave of
protests ensued. The crowds were massive, diverse, and largely unified
and peaceful. However, in urban areas throughout the country, there
was significant violence, property destruction, and looting of
businesses.2
* A. Gus Cleveland Distinguished Chair of Legal Ethics and Professionalism & Josiah
Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Emory
University (B.A., 1986); Vanderbilt Law School (J.D., 1989). First, I would like to thank
my terrific Research Assistant Isabel Alexander for her extensive and invaluable
assistance throughout the evolution of this article. I am also appreciative of the
thoughtful insights and suggestions provided by Professors Dan Coenen and Bruce Green.
In addition, the article benefited from questions posed and comments made during the
live portion of the Symposium. Finally, and most importantly, I thank my wife Kim for
her invariably astute contributions to everything I write and her unfailing support.
1 See Evan Hill, Ainara Tiefenthäler, et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police
Custody,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
31,
2020,
updated
Nov.
5,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html. Although the
length of time that Officer Derek Chauvin kneeled on George Floyd’s neck has been
widely reported at 8:46, it appears that it may have actually been longer.
2
See Meredith Deliso, Timeline: The Impact of George Floyd's Death in
(June
10,
Minneapolis and Beyond, ABC NEWS
2020), https://abcnews.go.com/US/timeline-impact-george-floyds-deathminneapolis/story?id=70999322.
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Rewind. On March 3, 1991, fourteen Los Angeles police officers
pursued Rodney King, a Black man suspected of drunk driving, on a
high-speed chase that culminated in several of the officers brutally
beating King. While King was on the ground, the officers kicked him
repeatedly and struck him at least fifty-six times with their nightsticks,
resulting in skull fractures, broken bones and teeth, and permanent
brain damage.3 Eighty-one seconds of the fifteen-minute attack was
caught on a grainy video that was subsequently viewed by millions
around the world.4 The public was outraged, but the streets did not
erupt in protests or violence, at least not yet. That would happen a year
later.
Two weeks after the incident, a Los Angeles County grand jury
indicted four of the officers—Theodore Briseno, Stacey Koon, Laurence
Powell, and Timothy Wind—on charges of felony assault and other
offenses.5 On April 29, 1992, they were found not guilty on all charges,
and as word of that verdict spread, so did the disbelief and anger,
setting off an almost immediate violent reaction in the streets of Los
Angeles, the scale and severity of which expanded and intensified over
the succeeding five days and nights. There was burning, looting, and
property destruction, as well as attacks on police, firefighters, and
hapless non-Black motorists who ventured into the South-Central
section of the city.6
Rewind again. On August 11, 1965, a routine traffic stop of
Marquette Frye, a Black citizen of the Watts area of Los Angeles,
escalated into a combative encounter between the police, Frye, and two
members of Frye’s family. Efforts to subdue Frye ended with one officer
reportedly jabbing him in the stomach with a nightstick before striking
him on the brow.7 The Fryes were eventually forcibly handcuffed,
3 See the Associated Press, Rodney King Riot: Timeline of Key Events, AP
NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017), https://apnews.com/article/fa4d04d8281443fc8db0e27d6be52081;
Anjuli Sastry & Karen Grigsby Bates, When LA Erupted In Anger: A Look Back At The
Rodney
King
Riots,
NPR
(Apr.
26,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-back-at-therodney-king-riots.
4 See John L. Mitchell & Shawn Hubler, Rodney King gets award of $3.8 million, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 20, 1994), https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-king-award19940420-story.html. (“Excerpts were aired around the world, serving as a flash point for
racial tensions as the grainy image of the cowering King was shown to billions of
viewers.”).
5 Id.
6 Id. See also infra note 158 and accompanying text.
7 See JERRY COHEN & WILLIAM S. MURPHY, BURN, BABY, BURN!: THE LOS ANGELES
RACE RIOTS OF AUGUST 1965 36 (1966).
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arrested, and taken away.8 All of this unfolded before the watchful eyes
of a throng of angry Black residents of Watts, who responded
instantaneously. As police vehicles left the area following the arrests,
the residents pelted them with rocks and bottles.9 This
contemporaneous, instinctive reaction quickly spread throughout the
community and spawned six days of unprecedented violence and
mayhem around South Los Angeles. There was burning, looting, and
property destruction. In addition, rioters attacked police officers,
firefighters, and motorists who unwittingly drove into the chaos.10
Unfortunately, I could go on recounting similar instances of police
excess directed at Black Americans followed by widespread protests and
intense civil unrest, many in 2020 alone.11 However, I selected these
three examples, in part, because of their striking similarities, but more
importantly, because of the two men who played significant roles in
their aftermaths—William Barr and Ramsey Clark. William Barr was
the U.S. Attorney General during the 1992 Los Angeles riots, and he
was the attorney general responsible for the federal response to the
police killing of George Floyd and the powerful public reaction that it
generated. Ramsey Clark was the U.S. Deputy Attorney General when
the Watts riots occurred but would go on to serve as attorney general
from 1967–1969, a period of widespread social upheaval that included
numerous additional riots inspired by police aggression towards Black
citizens, as well as the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968.
Clark’s Watts experience informed the approach he would take in
leading the federal response to these later outbreaks of civil rebellion.
Although the two men occupied some common ground in how they
addressed the rioting of their respective times, overall, the tone, and
tenor of, as well as the apparent motivation for their reactions seem to
have differed dramatically. Ramsey Clark, a liberal champion of civil

See id. at 37.
See id. at 61–62.
10 See id. at 67. For a detailed account of the Fryes’ arrests and the unrest that
followed, see Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Different Lyrics, Same Song: Watts, Ferguson, and the
Stagnating Effect of the Politics of Law and Order, 52 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV.
305 (2017) [hereinafter Brown, Different Lyrics]. See also GERALD HORNE, THE FIRE THIS
TIME: THE WATTS UPRISING AND THE 1960S (1995).
11 See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Derrick Bryson Taylor & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs,
What to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html; Aimee Ortiz, What to Know
About the Death of Rayshard Brooks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/rayshard-brooks-what-we-know.html. See also Brown,
Different Lyrics, supra note 10, at 312, n.24.
8
9
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rights, took an empathetic approach to the unrest, factoring in the
legitimate anger, frustration, and hopelessness that he believed were at
the root of urban violence. While there was a definite need to control the
situations and reduce the likelihood of physical harm and property
damage, Clark was loath to authorize a draconian show of force to
accomplish this. He was more concerned with potential excesses in law
enforcement than with the people’s rioting, looting, and property
damage. He believed that the answer to the violence was not
suppression, but rather, massive, collective effort directed towards
solving the underlying problems that caused it—in his view, the
principal motivating force was the continued disparate and unequal
treatment of Black citizens, especially in terms of education,
employment, and relations between police and the community.12 Clark
saw the so-called rioters as victims, not violent criminals who needed to
be dominated and potentially prosecuted.
William Barr, on the other hand, was and is a staunch proponent of
law and order. This stance guided his approach to the civil unrest he
faced, both in 1992 and 2020. He acknowledged the wrongful nature of
the police conduct in the Rodney King beating and the killing of George
Floyd, but his primary concern in connection with both incidents was
eliminating the unrest that the killing produced. In other words, Barr’s
tactic was to eradicate the symptom, not the problem, and his actions
and words reflected a close alignment and identification with law
enforcement and its efforts nationwide to maintain order in America’s
cities. For the most part, he condemned the actions of the “rioters,”
focusing on those he perceived as engaged in violent, destructive
behavior. Barr characterized them as gang members in 1992,13 and in
2020, as far left extremists, radicals, outside agitators, and Antifa—an
amalgamated assortment of anti-fascist organizations that he labeled
as domestic terrorists.14 His assessment of the 2020 unrest was that
peaceful protests were being hijacked by these fringe elements, and

See Brown, Different Lyrics, supra note 10, at 324–28.
See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
14 See Attorney General William P. Barr’s Statement on the Death of George Floyd and
Riots, DOJ PRESS RELEASE (May 30, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorneygeneral-william-p-barr-s-statement-death-george-floyd-and-riots
[hereinafter
Barr’s
Statement on the Death of George Floyd]; Attorney General William P. Barr’s Statement on
Riots and Domestic Terrorism, DOJ PRESS RELEASE (May 31, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-william-p-barrs-statement-riots-anddomestic-terrorism [hereinafter Barr’s Statement on Riots].
12
13
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they had to be stopped.15 Hearkening back to his handling of the Los
Angeles riots, Barr proclaimed that in 2020 “[t]he rule of law will
prevail,” as he believed it did in 1992.16
Clark and Barr’s divergent responses to highly similar instances of
social disorder raise critical questions about the role of the attorney
general in such contexts. Where exactly does responding to domestic
rebellion fit within the wide-ranging duties of the attorney general and
what is the scope of that authority? Is this an area in which it is
appropriate for the attorney general to yield to the will of the President,
or is the exercise of independence essential? Answering these rolerelated questions is crucial to assessing the two men’s respective
approaches in handling civil unrest.
The job of attorney general is complex and far-reaching, ranging from
administrative oversight of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
providing legal advice to the President and other executive officials, to
participating in executive policy-making as a member of the President’s
cabinet.17 The attorney general even has his or her hand in foreign
affairs through participation in National Security Council meetings.18
However, the most important function of the attorney general is to act
as the nation’s chief law enforcement official, the lead prosecutor for the
United States.19 It is in this capacity, that the attorney general bears
responsibility for investigating and addressing perceived abuses by the
police and the resultant civil unrest that our society has repeatedly
witnessed over the years.
Although allegiance to the President seems appropriate in carrying
out some of the attorney general’s duties and, in this regard, partisan
interests may come into play, ideally, politics should play no role in
responding to civil unrest. Of course, the attorney general’s views and
actions may coincide with what the chief executive believes and wants,
15 See Barr’s Statement on the Death of George Floyd, supra note 14 (“Unfortunately,
with the rioting that is occurring in many of our cities around the country, the voices of
peaceful protest are being hijacked by violent radical elements”).
16 Dept. of Justice, Attorney General William P. Barr’s Remarks on Mr. George Floyd
and Civil Unrest (June 4, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-generalwilliam-p-barr-s-remarks-mr-george-floyd-and-civil-unrest [hereinafter Barr’s Remarks on
Civil Unrest].
17 See infra notes 76‒89 and accompanying text.
18 See THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/.
19 See Andrew McCanse Wright, The Take Care Clause, Justice Department
Independence, and White House Control, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 353, 390 (2018) (“The
Attorney General serves as both a legal advisor to the President and chief law
enforcement officer with supervisory responsibility for criminal investigations and
prosecutions.”).
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but America’s principal law enforcement official has an obligation to act
independently and consistent with the rule of law, even if doing so will
be contrary to the President’s wishes.
In this article, I compare the respective manners in which Ramsey
Clark and William Barr responded to instances of civil unrest during
their tenures and assess each man’s correspondent fidelity to the ideal
of independence. Did they live up to their sworn responsibility? Or did
they allow personal morality, public sentiment, or political pressure to
influence their behavior?
Part II provides biographical background on the two men to gain an
appreciation for what experiences may have shaped their approaches as
attorney general, most specifically, with regard to addressing civil
unrest. Part III then generally discusses the attorney general’s role
and, in particular, the necessity for independence in fulfilling aspects of
that role. It also examines each attorney general’s personal views on
this important facet of their responsibilities. Part IV recounts how
Attorneys General Clark and Barr responded to civil unrest—for Clark,
the focus is on the Watts riots of 1965 and the widespread social
disturbances that occurred in the late 1960s; and for Barr the pertinent
episodes are the 1992 Los Angeles riots and the 2020 George Floyd
protests. The article concludes in Part V with a critical comparison of
the two men’s words and actions, in terms of their direct responses to
civil unrest and, more broadly, regarding the overarching issue of
racism within the criminal justice system.
While Clark and Barr both, to varying degrees, adhered to aspects of
independence and dedication to upholding the rule of law, in the end, it
appears that the quantity and quality of their independence was more a
function of their individual substance and ideals, rather than any
committed effort to conform to the dictates of their office. The two men’s
contrasting styles in addressing civil unrest, notwithstanding their
identical positions, leads to the somewhat troubling but unsurprising
conclusion that perhaps it is the attorney general who shapes the role,
not the role that shapes the attorney general. As the article
demonstrates, at the intersection of race and social discord, the identity
and perspective of the role-shaper can decisively influence the manner
in which justice is framed and administered.
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II. THE MAKING OF AN ATTORNEY GENERAL
A. Who is Ramsey Clark?
William Ramsey Clark was born in 1927 in Dallas, Texas.20 He was
the son of Tom C. Clark, who served as President Harry Truman’s
attorney general and as an Associate Justice on the U.S. Supreme
Court from 1950 to 1967. Though a Democrat, Tom was viewed as a
conservative member of the Court.21 His conservatism, however,
appeared to have little influence on his son’s eventual political views,
unless it inspired Ramsey to trend in the opposite direction.
One episode during Ramsey’s youth undoubtedly had a profound
effect upon his perception of justice and fairness. After the Japanese
bombing of Pearl Harbor, Tom Clark, then working in President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s DOJ, was appointed to oversee the
internment of Japanese Americans as the civilian coordinator of the
Alien Enemy Control Program for the West Region, described by one
official as the “toughest and nastiest job in the [DOJ].”22 This was a
truly dark chapter in America’s history, and Tom would express deep
regret for the integral role he played—“I have made a lot of mistakes in
my life, but one that I acknowledge publicly is my part in the
evacuation of the Japanese from California in 1942.”23
At the time, the attack on America and his father’s involvement in
the nation’s response actually inspired Ramsey, then only thirteen, to
attempt to enlist in the Marines.24 He was, of course, unsuccessful
because of his age but later would serve in the Marines near the end of
the war as a courier delivering confidential diplomatic and military
information from Washington to various parts of Europe and North
Africa.25 This experience, coupled with his exposure to his father’s
participation in the Japanese internment, laid the groundwork for
Ramsey’s lifelong opposition to war and commitment to protecting
human rights, domestically and internationally.
20 For an in-depth account of Ramsey Clark’s life, see LONNIE T. BROWN, JR.,
DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY: THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF RAMSEY CLARK (2019)
[hereinafter BROWN, DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY]. See also ALEXANDER WOHL,
FATHER, SON, AND CONSTITUTION: HOW JUSTICE TOM CLARK AND ATTORNEY GENERAL
RAMSEY CLARK SHAPED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2013).
21 See BROWN, DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY, supra note 20, at 224.
22 MIMI CLARK GRONLUND, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE TOM C. CLARK: A LIFE OF SERVICE
62 (2010); see also WOHL, supra note 20, at 37‒43.
23 GRONLUND, supra note 22, at 74.
24 See BROWN, DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY, supra note 20, at 25.
25 See id.
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Following his honorable discharge from the military, Ramsey
completed his interrupted high school work through correspondence
courses. He then embarked on a remarkably concentrated academic
odyssey, obtaining a bachelor’s degree from the University of Texas, as
well as a master’s degree in history and a J.D. from the University of
Chicago in less than four years.26
After he graduated from Chicago, Ramsey moved to Dallas, Texas,
where he practiced law for the next ten years with Clark, Coon, Holt &
Fisher, later known as Clark, Reed & Clark.27 In 1961, at the age of 33,
he joined newly elected President John F. Kennedy’s Justice
Department as Assistant Attorney General for the Lands Division, the
predecessor to what is now the Environment and Natural Resources
Division.28
Notwithstanding the environmental-related focus of his position,
Ramsey, like all leaders within the DOJ at that time, was thrust into
the heart of the Kennedy administration’s efforts in the area of civil
rights.29 For starters, Bobby Kennedy dispatched him to Alabama,
Georgia, South Carolina, and Louisiana in 1962 and 1963 to enforce the
federal school desegregation mandate that was being studiously
subverted throughout the south.30 He later played a major role in
monitoring the historic admission of James Meredith as the University
of Mississippi’s first Black student.31 In the wake of this experience,
Ramsey drafted a memo to Bobby Kennedy that outlined
recommendations for civil rights initiatives and became a major
impetus for what would be the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964.32
Notably, throughout his early years in the DOJ, Ramsey Clark
gained a reputation for independence and a willingness to express his
views openly, even when those perspectives may have been outside the
mainstream. He was unfailingly principled, many believed to the point
of being downright obstructive. Ed Guthman, a spokesperson for
Kennedy’s DOJ, stated that “Ramsey usually was the one who raised
See id. at 28.
See id. at 29.
28 Victor S. Navasky, Wrong Guy for the Wrong Post at the Wrong Time?, SAT. EVENING
POST (Dec. 16, 1967).
29 See RICHARD L. SCHOTT & DAGMAR S. HAMILTON, PEOPLE, POSITIONS, AND POWER:
THE POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 89 (1983).
30 See BROWN, DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY, supra note 20, at 34‒35.
31 See id. at 35.
32 See Ramsey Clark Oral History Interview II (Feb. 11, 1969), by Harri Baker,
LBJ Presidential Library, http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histor
ies/clark_r/clark-r2.pdf.
26
27
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the moral questions about issues.”33 Along the same lines, New York
Times reporter Fred Graham noted that Clark’s primary weakness was
“not complaisance to pressure from above but a tendency to stand on
principle when practical men would compromise.”34 Lyndon Johnson’s
special counsel Larry Temple described Clark as tough-minded,
preferring to resign rather than do something with which he
disagreed.35 Clark’s moral rigidity earned him the nickname “the
Preacher” among his DOJ colleagues.36
Following President Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, then-Vice
President Johnson ascended to the presidency and drafted Ramsey
Clark as a White House assistant working on appointments and other
special matters.37 Bobby Kennedy remained as attorney general, but
really in name only, and once he formally exited the DOJ, Johnson
replaced him with Nicholas Katzenbach and made Clark deputy
attorney general.38
As deputy attorney general, Clark led the federal oversight of the
third Selma-to-Montgomery march organized by Martin Luther King.
Because local law enforcement had unleashed horrific violence against
peaceful marchers in an earlier Selma-to-Montgomery effort—
thereafter known as Bloody Sunday39—the federal government was
intent on preventing an encore by Alabama police and antagonistic
locals. Clark was charged with maintaining peace and protecting Dr.
King, both of which he successfully managed.40 He also worked
tirelessly on the President’s behalf to secure passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,41 and headed the federal government’s investigation
into the Watts riots, which will be discussed in more detail in Part IV.
33 Andrew Maykuth, Standing Alone, PHIL. INQ. SUNDAY MAG. (July 7, 1991) (quoting
Ed Guthman), http://www.maykuth.com/Projects/clark91.htm.
34 BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
296 (1988).
35 See Larry Temple Oral History Interview V (Aug. 11, 1970), LBJ Presidential
Library, https://www.discoverlbj.org/item /oh-temple-19700811-5-72-33-e.
36
See Peter Carlson, The Crusader, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2002),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/2002/12/15/the-crusader/9de49dd7.
37 See SCHOTT & HAMILTON, supra note 29, at 89.
38 See Nomination of Ramsey Clark to Be Deputy Attorney General of the United
States: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. SENATE 89th Congress (Feb.
8, 1965).
39 See DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE CHILDREN 511–15 (1998).
40 See BROWN, DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY, supra note 20, at 44–45.
41 See Ramsey Clark Oral History Interview II (Feb. 11, 1969), by Harri Baker,
LBJ Presidential Library, http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histor
ies/clark_r/clark-r2.pdf.
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In October 1966, Clark became acting attorney general when
Katzenbach left the position for another post in the State Department,
and was officially named attorney general in March of 1967. He had
acquired many fans during his tenure in the DOJ. In endorsing Clark
for the post, Johnson’s personal advisor John Macy wrote:
He has the legal ability; he understands the political process; he is an
able administrator; he has courage and high personal standards; he
holds the respect of Congress, the Cabinet, the bar, the courts and
the bureaucracy; and he is sensitive to your needs and your problems
and is thoroughly loyal to you.42

Johnson personally had a very high opinion of Clark. He admired
“his powerful and succinct speaking ability, and had great respect for
[his] moral character.”43 In the end, Ramsey Clark proved to be the
consensus choice. His confirmation was a foregone conclusion and
proceeded quickly, without even a hint of controversy. In thanking the
President for the nomination, Clark wrote:
I am deeply honored that you have chosen me to be your Attorney
General. The opportunity to serve a cause deemed mighty is the most
that one can ask in life. This you have given me. The quest for the
Great Society, for justice for all, is the high adventure of our time. I
hope to help us find them.44

B. Who is William Barr?
William Pelham Barr was born in 1950 in New York. The son of a
conservative educator, Donald Barr, William too leaned right from an
early age. His primary education was at Corpus Christi, a diverse
parochial school located near Columbia University’s campus.
Reportedly, when he was but eight years old, he delivered a speech in
class supporting the re-election of Republican incumbent President
Dwight Eisenhower.45

SCHOTT & HAMILTON, supra note 29, at 91.
MURPHY, supra note 34, at 295.
44 Letter from Ramsey Clark to President Lyndon B. Johnson (on file with the LBJ
Presidential Library, Personal Papers of Ramsey Clark, Box 121, “R. Clark, Personal,
Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1961–67”).
45 See Marie Brenner, “I Had No Problem Being Politically Different”: Young William
FAIR
(Oct.
7,
2019),
Barr
Among
the
Manhattan
Liberals,
VANITY
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/10/the-untold-tale-of-young-william-barr.
42
43
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He subsequently attended Horace Mann School, an elite private
institution in the Bronx,46 and there, seemingly acquired and cultivated
his view regarding the far-reaching authority of the President, a
position that he has maintained through the present. One classmate
recalls Billy—as William or Bill was known at that time—proclaiming
that “All the president needs to declare war is an executive order.”47
The classmate believed that Billy’s view of the Constitution was that it
created a concentration of federal power in the committee chairs,
cabinet members, Supreme Court, and the President.48
William attended Horace Mann during the mid-1960s, graduating in
1967, a period of unprecedented political protests and societal rebellion,
related principally to the civil rights movement and the war in
Vietnam. At that time, his father was headmaster at the prestigious
Dalton School in Manhattan. The elder Barr’s overt conservative
politics made him a controversial figure there and placed him at odds
with many of the liberal-leaning students and parents, particularly
with regard to civil rights and antiwar protests.49 The riots across the
country in the aftermath of Dr. King’s assassination also included New
York City and even Dalton, which apparently infuriated Donald Barr.
One former student recounted that Donald viewed this as
“‘disrespecting the school’ by encouraging impressionable kids to follow
the lead of older college-age rebels who were engaging in acts of civil
disobedience.”50 He was highly exercised over the riots at nearby
Columbia and disdainful of the group Students for a Democratic
Society, which he described as “radical.”51 Notably, Donald attributed
the unrest to a desire for anarchy and “the mob tactics of the New
Left.”52 He also spoke contemptuously about the Black Power
movement, opposing “the black militants . . . who are tired of asking for

46 It is worth mentioning that the Roy Cohn, the infamous legal fixer for various highprofile figures, including Donald Trump, was also a graduate of Horace Mann. See id.; see
also infra notes 222–24 and accompanying text.
47 Brenner, supra note 45. See also David Rohde, William Barr, Trump’s Sword and
YORKER
(Jan.
13,
2020),
Shield,
NEW
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/01/20/william-barr-trumps-sword-and-shield
(same classmate observing that Barr is a “true believer” who has long believed that “only
a strong President [can] protect America from threats”).
48 Brenner, supra note 45.
49 See id.; see also Rohde, supra note 47 (noting that Dalton parents viewed Donald
Barr “as autocratic, insular, and obsessed with adherence to rules”).
50 Brenner, supra note 45.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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a little share and are going to take a big share of Whitey’s good life and
education.”53 His son seemed to embrace similar views regarding the
unrest.
William, then a freshman at Columbia, voiced opinions that would be
consistent with those he later espoused as attorney general. For
example, in critiquing the government’s handling of the riots, he
suggested that the leadership had failed by not engaging in more
forceful tactics—“If the leaders had taken a stronger stance, up front, it
would not have degenerated so much.”54 He punctuated this statement
by cryptically observing that “1968 [. . .] was formative for me.”55
Barr expressed the collegiate ambition to one day lead the CIA. In
keeping with this goal, he interned with the agency during two of his
summer breaks, and after obtaining his master’s in Chinese Studies,
joined the CIA staff as an intelligence analyst.56 He later began taking
law school classes at night at The George Washington University, and
in 1975, he left his position as an analyst to work in the CIA’s Office of
Legal Counsel. In this capacity, Barr would work with agency director
George H.W. Bush, who was appointed to that position the following
year.
After graduating from law school, Barr clerked for Judge Malcolm
Wilkey on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit, and then
joined the law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge. Jimmy
Carter was President during this time, but lost his re-election bid to
Ronald Reagan. In 1982, Barr left Shaw Pittman for the Reagan White
House, accepting a position as deputy assistant director for legal
policy.57 He returned to private practice at Shaw Pittman in 1985 and
in 1988, following the election of George H.W. Bush as President, Barr
was appointed to head the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, tasked with
advising the chief executive.58
Consistent with his youthful musings on presidential authority, Barr
used his position, to the extent that he could, to press for the supremacy
of executive power, particularly with regard to potential “legislative

53 Id. Donald Barr’s combative style and controversial actions eventually led to his
being fired from his position as headmaster at Dalton. See id.; see also Rohde, supra note
47 (noting that Donald Barr was forced out of his job in the early 1970s “after a protracted
and ugly public fight”).
54 Brenner, supra note 45.
55 Id.
56 See Rohde, supra note 47.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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encroachment.”59 He wrote a controversial opinion supporting President
Bush’s “inherent constitutional authority” to order arrests on foreign
soil, the target here being Panamanian leader and alleged drug
trafficker and money launderer Manuel Noriega.60 Similarly, after
Barr’s elevation to the position of deputy attorney general, he argued
that the President did not need congressional authorization to declare
war in the interest of protecting national security. Despite this view,
Barr putatively advised the President, out of an abundance of caution,
to obtain Congress’s approval to send troops to Iraq in response to
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.61 Such advice seemed
more political than legal, exceeding what might be expected of a deputy
attorney general under the circumstances. Nevertheless, Bush followed
Barr’s counsel, obtained Congress’s blessing, and ordered military
action in Kuwait in January of 1991.62
Barr ascended to the position of attorney general later in 1991,63 and
in that role was vocal in his condemnation of previous efforts at
criminal justice reform. In the 1960s, many, including Ramsey Clark,
embraced the notion that crime in America was largely a by-product of
societal ills, especially poverty. Barr could not have disagreed more.
According to him, “[v]iolent crime is caused not by physical factors, such
as not enough food stamps in the stamp program, but ultimately by
moral factors.”64 Indeed, he believed that this sort of coddling would
worsen the problem. And he was scornful of the view that there were
innocent victims who get caught up in and harmed by the system itself:
“The notion that there are sympathetic people out there who become
hapless victims of the criminal-justice system and are locked away in
federal prison beyond the time they deserve is simply a myth.”65 True to
this perspective, as attorney general, Barr took a hardline approach to
sentencing for drug offenses and to illegal immigration.
Notwithstanding his tough-on-crime approach to street-level offenses
and immigration, Barr was seemingly disinclined to turn an accusatory
59 Id. It should be noted that Barr’s view regarding the supreme authority of the
President appears to be limited to when Republicans hold the nation’s highest office. See
id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 It is important to note that Barr was just forty-one years old at the time of his
appointment. Only Bobby Kennedy at age thirty-five and Ramsey Clark at age thirtynine, were younger when appointed to the same post.
64 Rohde, supra note 47.
65 Id.
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eye inward at administration officials. Despite numerous calls for
independent investigations of perceived wrongdoing, Barr steadfastly
resisted such requests, including one to examine executive dealings
with Iraq in advance of its Kuwaiti invasion.66
In 1993, after Bill Clinton was elected as President, Barr exited
government service and returned to the private sector as executive vice
president and general counsel for GTE Corporation, a position he held
until 2008 when he took an early retirement. While he dabbled in
politics from afar, it was mostly to espouse views on actions that were
being taken by or against government officials. Although he was not
initially a supporter of President Trump’s candidacy, he eventually
embraced him, particularly after Trump’s election. Barr even offered his
unsolicited written opinion to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein
on the untenable nature of pursuing obstruction of justice charges
against the President for alleged actions taken in response to Robert
Mueller’s investigation.67 This memo to Rosenstein may have been an
audition of sorts to become the deputy attorney general’s boss.68
Whether or not that was the case, on February 14, 2019, Barr
officially became President Trump’s attorney general, replacing
embattled Attorney General Jeff Sessions who had resigned under
pressure from the President, and taking over from acting Attorney
General Matthew Whitaker. Although many praised Barr’s nomination
and felt that he would be a steadying addition to President Trump’s
Cabinet, his confirmation process was not without controversy. Various
concerns were raised about Barr’s record and views, including his
strident efforts to increase incarceration while attorney general in the
early 90s,69 his refusal to acknowledge racial inequities in the criminal
66 Id. (observing that columnist William Safire referred to Barr as “cover-up general
Barr”).
67 See Devlin Barrett, Attorney General Nominee Wrote Memo Criticizing Mueller
Obstruction
Probe,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
20,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/attorney-general-nomineewrote-memo-criticizing-mueller-obstruction-probe/2018/12/20/72a01304-044b-11e9-b5df5d3874f1ac36_story.html; ANDREW WEISSMANN, WHERE LAW ENDS: INSIDE THE MUELLER
INVESTIGATION (2020).
68 See Jennifer Rubin, What to Make of William Barr’s Memo?, WASH. POST
(Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/21/what-makewilliam-barrs-memo/.
69 See, e.g., Miles Parks, Barr’s Record on Mass Incarceration Comes Under Scrutiny in
Confirmation
Hearing,
NPR
(Jan.
16,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/16/683009766/barrs-record-on-mass-incarceration-comesunder-scrutiny-in-confirmation-hearing. See also William P. Barr, The Case for More
Incarceration
(Oct.
18,
1992),
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justice system,70 and his documented misgivings about the Robert
Mueller-led investigation of possible Russian interference in the 2016
election, President Trump’s associations with Russian officials, and
possible obstruction of justice by the President.71
More generally, strong objections were raised concerning Barr’s longheld views on the power of the chief executive, leading some to believe
that he would not be truly independent from the President. Rather,
given his position that the President’s authority is virtually allencompassing, the fear was that he would simply do President Trump’s
bidding, so to speak, or perhaps even worse, clear the way for Trump to
do whatever he deemed politically expedient. Critics believed that an
attorney general with this mindset would be especially dangerous in the
Trump administration. As Professor Neil Kinkopf ominously observed,
Public confidence in the rule of law depends on there being an
Attorney General who will not allow the President to do whatever he
wants with the Justice Department. William Barr’s views of
presidential power are so radically mistaken that he is simply the
wrong man, at the wrong time to be Attorney General of the United
States.72

Barr pushed back on such objections, insisting that he would be
independent and could not be “bullied”: “I feel I’m in a position in life
where I can do the right thing and not really care about the
consequences. In the sense that I can be truly independent.”73 He went
on to emphasize that he “will not be bullied into doing anything [he]
think[s] is wrong[,]” proclaiming that “I’m going to do what I think is
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/139583NCJRS.pdf.; infra notes 175‒78 and
accompanying text.
70 See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing on Att’y Gen. William Barr (Jul. 28,
2020), https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/house-judiciary-committee-hearing-ofattorney-general-barr-transcript-july-28.
71 See WEISSMANN, supra note 67, at 225–42.
72 Statement of Neil J. Kinkopf, Professor of Law, Georgia State University, College of
Law Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Hearing on the
Nomination of William P. Barr to be Attorney General of the United States (Jan. 16,
2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Neil%20J.%20
Kinkopf%20Testimony.pdf; see also House Judiciary Comm. Hearing on Att’y Gen.
William Barr (Jul. 28, 2020), https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/house-judiciarycommittee-hearing-of-attorney-general-barr-transcript-july-28
(quoting
Professor
Kinkopf).
73 Aaron Blake, 9 Takeaways from William Barr’s Confirmation Hearing, WASH. POST
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/01/15/key-early-momentswilliam-barrs-confirmation-hearing/.
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right.”74 In the end, the Senate confirmed Barr by a vote of 54-45, and
despite his reassurance that he could be “truly independent,” Barr’s
record raises legitimate questions about his fealty to that attestation.75
The real question, though, is: How independent must or should an
attorney general be? Is independence an all-encompassing aspect of the
role, or does it depend upon the issue and circumstances presented?
III. INDEPENDENCE AS A COMPONENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ROLE
The attorney general’s role is wide-ranging and complex, part
political, part administrative, and part legal.76 As an integral part of the
President’s Cabinet, the attorney general advises on policy matters
unrelated to the administration of justice and renders legal advice and
opinions when requested by the President or other heads of executive
departments.77 As a DOJ administrator, the attorney general helps
define departmental priorities, submits budgetary requests,
participates in selecting and screening nominees for the federal bench,
and proposes legislation pertaining to the justice system.78 Apart from
these responsibilities, the attorney general also serves as the nation’s
chief law enforcement officer and, in that capacity, is the ultimate
overseer of federal criminal prosecutions.79
In carrying out certain of these duties, it is understandable that the
attorney general, as a presidential appointee, will exhibit loyalty
toward the chief executive, working to ensure that the President’s
lawful objectives are achieved.80 Indeed, in providing legal advice, while
the attorney general should exercise independent professional judgment
Id.
See, e.g., Rebecca Roiphe, A Typology of Justice Department Lawyers’ Roles and
Responsibilities, 98 N.C.L. REV. 1077, 1122‒30 (2020); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., What
William Barr Can Learn from Ramsey Clark, STAN. UNIV PRESS BLOG (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://stanfordpress.typepad.com/blog/2020/01/lonnie-brown-on-william-barr-ramseyclark-and-the-necessity-of-independence-lonnie-t-brown-words-words-words-during.html.
76 See Roiphe, supra note 75, at 1092.
77 See id. at 1093; Arthur Selwyn Miller, The Attorney General as the President’s
Lawyer, in ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 45 (Am. Enterprise
Inst. Public Pol’y Res., 1968).
78 See Roiphe, supra note 75, at 1092.
79 See id. at 1092–93.
80 See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of
Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 37 (2018) (acknowledging that the attorney general, as a
Cabinet officer, “plainly answers to the President as to certain matters”); id. at 66 (noting
that the attorney general “will likely be a political ally of the President”); Roiphe, supra
note 75, at 1097 (“if the Attorney General is to work so closely with the President that
appointed him, we can’t fully expect a neutral performance of the job”).
74
75
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like any other lawyer, he or she will undoubtedly endeavor to provide
the President with the type of guidance that he wants to hear, if at all
possible.
However, in carrying out the responsibilities related to being the
nation’s chief prosecutor, the attorney general should exercise a higher
degree of independence in striving to guarantee fairness and justice.
Partisan politics or the personal interests of the President should not
come into play.81 While the federal prosecutorial function is vested in
the executive branch, there is apparently no constitutional support for
the proposition that the President has authority to make prosecutorial
decisions.82 Rather, the extent of the President’s authority in this
regard is limited to appointing the attorney general and issuing
pardons.83
Admittedly, there is a lack of concrete constitutional or legislative
authority requiring the attorney general to act independently in
carrying out the prosecutorial function.84 It is, however, undeniably a
long-accepted norm for prosecutors more generally, and if there was an
expectation that the attorney general should behave differently, one
would have expected Congress to affirmatively legislate to make this
clear.85 Nevertheless, there are those who embrace the position that the
President possesses ultimate authority to direct prosecutorial decisionmaking,86 but this argument too is lacking in firm legal authority.87

81 See Green & Roiphe, supra note 80, at 7 (noting that some scholars maintain that
the attorney general or any other federal prosecutor “has a legal obligation to resist
presidential control and to exercise independent professional judgment”); id. at 22
(observing that attorney general nominees and senators have emphasized the importance
of the attorney general acting independently of the President).
82 See id. at 8.
83 See id. at 9–10 (noting that “the power to hire and fire does not necessarily imply the
power to instruct subordinate officials how to do their jobs”).
84 See id. at 33 (observing that “some senators and attorney general nominees
seemingly assumed that the Attorney General may not defer to the President in
individual criminal cases, but the source of that assumption is unclear”).
85 See id. at 37 (observing that “[c]ongressional silence in response to sustained or
repeated conduct may express congressional acquiescence in the exercise of authority”).
86 See, e.g., Allison Frankel, DOJ Independence Entrenched and Ingrained, Will
(May
21,
2018),
Survive
Trump:
Historian,
Law
Prof,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-independence/doj-independence-entrenched-andingrained-will-survive-trump-historian-law-prof-idUSKCN1IM2DP (recounting Professor
Alan Dershowitz’s opinion that the Constitution authorizes the President “to tell the
Justice Department who to investigate, who to prosecute, and who not to investigate, and
who not to prosecute”).
87 See generally Green & Roiphe, supra note 80, at 23–26.
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Objectively and practically, the case for independence seems
stronger. The President always has the power to discharge the attorney
general if dissatisfied with his or her performance, and this authority
carries with it a certain degree of control.88 Despite this power, one
would expect a conscientious, rational chief executive to take such
action only in response to instances of misfeasance or malfeasance, not
in reaction to an attorney general acting independently in the name of
justice and fairness, though contrary to the President’s political desires.
It is also important to recall that even though William Barr has been
a lifelong, staunch proponent of the supreme authority of the
President,89 in his 2019 confirmation hearing, he stressed that he could
and would be “truly independent.”90 Furthermore, in 1991, he similarly
proclaimed in unequivocal terms that the DOJ must remain
independent and free from political influence—“nothing could be more
destructive of our system of government, of the rule of law, or
Department of Justice as an institution, than any toleration of political
interference with the enforcement of the law.”91 Why emphasize this, if
independence is not an expected component of the role?
For his part, Ramsey Clark’s actions as attorney general speak for
themselves in terms of his commitment to being independent. He was
independent to a fault, bordering on insubordinate, perhaps.92
President Johnson’s special counsel, Larry Temple, observed that
“[e]ven when [the President] strongly expressed certain views, if
Ramsey disagreed, he did what he thought was right.”93 Although Clark
remained Johnson’s attorney general until the end of the President’s
term, there is little question that the possibility of firing him crossed
LBJ’s mind on a number of occasions.
Hence, from these two attorneys general’s points of view,
independence was an important aspect of their role, at least with regard
to the prosecutorial function. In addition, ample historical support

See id. at 23.
See, e.g., supra notes 47‒48 and accompanying text.
90 See supra notes 73‒75 and accompanying text.
91 William Barr Believes in Justice Department Independence. He Might Have to Fight
for it, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/william-barrbelieves-in-justice-department-independence-he-might-have-to-fight-forit/2018/12/07/1c1fa01c-fa5a-11e8-863c-9e2f864d47e7_story.html.
92 See BROWN, DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY, supra note 20, at 99‒116 (discussing
various incidents in which Ramsey Clark acted contrary to the President’s wishes).
93 Id. at 25.
88
89
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reinforces this perspective.94 With this in mind, the next section
documents each man’s handling of dramatic episodes of racial unrest
spawned by police excess directed toward Black citizens and considers
their actions in comparison to how their respective Presidents wanted
to respond. How independent were Clark and Barr?
IV. CIVIL UNREST AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
In terms of responding to civil unrest, there are two primary
components. The first is determining the appropriate response from a
law enforcement perspective. The civil unrest of the 1960s, 1990s, and
2000s all involved physical violence and property destruction.
Regardless of one’s opinion of the legitimacy of such reactions, the
government must act to ensure the safety of its citizens and restore and
maintain calm to the maximum extent possible. Local authorities have
a significant responsibility in this regard, but the magnitude of the
unrest during these periods warranted federal involvement, led by the
attorney general as the nation’s chief law enforcement official. In
carrying out this charge, it is understandable that the attorney general
will consult with and take some degree of direction from the President,
and in the end, it will be the President who makes the final decision
concerning what strategy should be taken to protect the American
public.
However, the attorney general’s role is still to act independently in
advising the President regarding the proper response. He or she should
not blindly take direction from the President, but rather must offer
sound advice and counsel to ensure that the chief executive makes a
fully informed decision. In addition, if the President ultimately takes a
position with which the attorney general strongly disagrees, it may be
his or her professional responsibility to refuse to carry out the
President’s instructions.95
94 See Green & Roiphe, supra note 80, at 75 (“The history and policy strongly suggest
that . . . the Attorney General . . . may not accept direction from the President but must
make the ultimate decisions about how to conduct individual investigations and
prosecutions, even at the risk of being fired for disobeying the President.”).
95 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer shall
not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed
course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law”); Id. r. 1.16
(providing that a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if “the client insists
upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement”).
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The second aspect of the attorney general’s role in responding to civil
unrest is purely prosecutorial. In each instance that will be discussed,
the precipitating event was an act of police aggression directed toward
Black citizens. As a result, it was incumbent upon the attorney general
to exercise independent discretion in determining whether federal
charges should be brought against the officers involved. In addition,
with regard to the citizens who instigated or actively engaged in the
unrest, the attorney general similarly had to decide, independently,
whether federal prosecution was warranted.
The manner in which Attorneys General Clark and Barr navigated
these two critical components of their role in responding to the racial
discord of their times is divergent and revealing.
A. Ramsey Clark and the Watts Riots
In the aftermath of the violent arrests in Watts of Marquette Frye,
his mother, and stepbrother in South Los Angeles by the California
Highway Patrol, Black residents vented their anger and frustration
through six days of burning, looting, and battling law enforcement
officials. The initial police strategy to quell the unrest was to retreat
entirely in the hope that things would naturally subside.96 When this
tactic failed, officers returned with a vengeance, intent on forcefully
bringing the situation under control. Official violence, however, was
met with hostility, and rather than reducing the riotous behavior, the
police’s heavy-handed tactics escalated the disturbance.97 Once it
became apparent that the Los Angeles police were incapable of ending
the strife alone, the California National Guard was called in for
assistance. Unexpectedly, this too initially resulted in an increase in
burning, looting, and violence. Eventually, fatigue appeared to set in,
and that, combined with the presence of the National Guard, brought
the riots to an end.98
While the riots were undoubtedly a manifestation of a serious policecommunity relations problem with the citizens of South Los Angeles,
many local and national leaders reacted by defending law enforcement
and casting the lion’s share of the blame for the unrest on those
citizens. Los Angeles Police Chief William Parker believed that the
concept of civil disobedience had created a disrespect for the law and
96 See HORNE, supra note 10, at 56 (“Police tried pulling back and closing off the area
where the rioting was worst on the theory that their absence might calm things down.”).
97 See Brown, Different Lyrics, supra note 10, at 315. See also COHEN & MURPHY, supra
note 7, at 68–72.
98 See Brown, Different Lyrics, supra note 10, at 316.
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contributed significantly to this mass showing of contempt for law
enforcement by Black citizens.99 He warned that “if the citizens of Los
Angeles haven’t learned from the riot that they must support strong
law enforcement, ‘next time they’ll blow up the whole city.’”100
Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty echoed his police chief’s sentiment and
mocked the narrative that police brutality was at the heart of the
unrest, referring to that notion as the “big lie” perpetrated by outside
antagonists.101 According to Yorty:
Communists, fellow travelers, dupes, and demagogues have . . .
deliberately foment[ed] antagonism to law enforcement officers,
inciting the residents to resent and resist officers in the proper
professional performance of their always difficult and often
dangerous duty to protect the rights of law-abiding citizens to be
secure in their persons and property.102

Many national leaders responded in a similar fashion, pointing an
accusatory finger at Martin Luther King and his followers for
cultivating a culture of disobeying the law within the Black community.
South Carolina Representative Albert Watson maintained that:
“Repeatedly [King] has advocated the violation of local law, and he and
his cohorts have led thousands of Americans into a life of civil
disobedience.”103 Alabama Representative James Martin came to the
defense of the police and argued for responsible leaders to reestablish
respect for law and order.104 He further demanded a halt to the “verbal
lynching of policemen who are being used as an excuse for every robber,
rapist, and murderer who sets himself against society and the civilized
rules which must govern society.”105
Even President Johnson initially responded with biting criticism
directed toward the rioters, equating their actions with those of white
supremacists:

99 See COHEN & MURPHY, supra note 7, at 69 (“You cannot tell people to disobey the
law and not expect them to have disrespect for the law.”); Id. at 277 (“Those who advocate
the violation of laws that have neither been repealed nor declared unconstitutional
advocate anarchy.”).
100 Id. at 277–78.
101 Id. at 280–81.
102 Id.
103 85 CONG. REC. H20793 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1965) (statement of Rep. Watson).
104 See 85 CONG. REC. H20757 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1965) (statement of Rep. Martin).
105 Id.
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A rioter with a Molotov cocktail in his hands is not fighting for civil
rights any more than a Klansman with a sheet on his back and a
mask on his face. They are both . . . lawbreakers, destroyers of
constitutional rights and liberties, and ultimately destroyers of a free
America.106

This statement, however, was for public consumption. Privately, the
President authorized government action to aid Black families in
Watts,107 and he appointed a small task force to investigate the causes
of the riots and propose solutions. This is where Ramsey Clark came
in—Johnson made him chair of the task force.
Then deputy attorney general, Clark’s work in connection with this
task force would profoundly influence his perspectives on race, law
enforcement, and criminal justice, which in turn would animate the
manner in which he responded to the racial unrest that continued to
erupt throughout the balance of the 1960s. Clark employed a grassroots
strategy in carrying out his duties as chair, conducting numerous
townhall-type meetings with groups of Black residents of Watts,
affording virtually anyone who wanted to speak the opportunity to be
heard.108 The reception that Clark received from the people was mostly
harsh and accusatory.109 Notably, he was not simply offering them the
chance to vent their frustrations. Clark approached them with an open
mind and sincerely empathetic disposition. He listened intently and
learned much from what the participants shared.110
Despite the strong language and anger directed towards Clark, he
never lost his composure and always treated the citizens with dignity
and respect.111 Fellow task force member Roger Wilkins observed that
this was the first time that he had ever witnessed “a powerful white
man take poor black strangers seriously . . . . [Clark] was more sensitive

DAVID C. CARTER, THE MUSIC HAS GONE OUT OF THE MOVEMENT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND
60–61 (2009).
107 Id. at 61.
108 UNITED STATES PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS, REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS, AUGUST 11–15, 1965 61 (Sept.
17, 1965) [hereinafter CLARK REPORT].
109 Id. at 16 (observing that the citizens’ views were “expressed with emotion, urgency
and eloquence—but in many instances, with simple harshness”).
110 See CARTER, supra note 106, at 172 (observing that Clark “listened” and “took
copious notes while those in attendance, their indignation often coming out, shared
accounts of all the problems—most notably police brutality—they faced in Watts”).
111 See ROGER WILKINS, A MAN’S LIFE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 172 (1982) (“[Ramsey]
didn’t get flustered by the rage. It went on hour after hour. He was never angry or selfrighteous, never lost his manners or his interest.”).
106

THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION, 1965–1968
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to the problems of poor blacks than [Wilkins] imagined any white man
could be.”112
The ultimate written report that the task force produced was
powerful and unfiltered, using verbatim quotes from Watts citizens
about their plight.113 The most prominent concerns exposed by the task
force related to unemployment, inferior education, and hostile policecommunity relations.114 The demoralizing combination of these three
societal ills created a deep sense of isolation, hopelessness, and anger
within the Black community. According to the report, the violent
arrests of the Fryes were not the cause of the riots. Rather, they served
merely as the spark or catalyst for igniting the rage and frustration
that had long been simmering throughout Watts.115
The persistent employment and education woes alone were enough to
create a sense of desperation and unrest, but the accompanying
antagonistic police presence made matters significantly worse. The
perception in Watts was that law enforcement viewed the Black
community as “hostile territory to be kept in check by a continuous
show of force.”116 The citizens believed that the police were
“unnecessarily impolite and even insulting” in their routine encounters
with one another,117 not to mention, overtly brutal in ostensibly
carrying out their duties.118 This destructively generated distrust and
fear on both sides.119
The ultimate conclusion of the task force’s report was that future
unrest could only be prevented by addressing the underlying social
issues, particularly the problematic relationship between the Black
community and the police. The task force recognized that this was a tall
but not impossible order, requiring “patient, determined, and massive

Id. at 172–73.
For a detailed discussion of the Clark Report, see Brown, Different Lyrics, supra
note 10, at 324–28.
114 Although these concerns were the most significant, the report addressed nine
separate issues that the task force deemed critical to addressing the underlying causes of
the civil unrest. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 108, at 27–60.
115 See id. at 50 (observing that the “arrests of August 11 were only the spark that
ignited a highly combustible environment”).
116 Id. at 57.
117 Id. at 58; see also id. at 57 (noting reports of encounters between police and Black
citizens as being perceived as “unnecessarily brusque.”).
118 See id. at 57 (recounting that the “charge of police ‘brutality’ is a dominant theme of
conversation and editorial comment in the Negro community.”); id. at 58.
119 See id. at 57 (noting the existence of “reciprocal distrust and fear” between Black
citizens and the police).
112
113

812

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72

effort”120 from “every component of the government” and individual
citizens, including Black citizens.121
The task force’s report was unfiltered and moving. It brought to light
the reality of the pain, suffering, and indignities that were endemic
within the Black community, but it was also optimistic about the future
if the government and broader society made the necessary commitment.
The latter turned out to be whimsical thinking. President Johnson
received the report on September 17, 1965, and besides being
distributed among a narrow group of government officials, no one ever
saw it. Apparently, unhappy with its content, Johnson declined to
release the report publicly.122
While this was undoubtedly frustrating for Ramsey Clark, his Watts
experience taught him much about the Black community. He came to
understand and accept the legitimacy of the concerns expressed by
Black citizens, and firmly believed that it was essential to treat them
with dignity and respect.123 It is with this compassionate perspective
that Attorney General Clark would lead the federal government’s
response to the historic civil unrest that would continue for the balance
of the 1960s.
B. Ramsey Clark and Subsequent Civil Unrest
Devastating riots triggered by aggressive police conduct directed
toward Black Americans occurred in 1966 and 1967, the most severe of
which took place in Cleveland, Newark, and Detroit.124 The latter two
erupted on Ramsey Clark’s watch as attorney general and gave him the
opportunity to put his Watts experience into practice. However, in his
new role, Clark would not be able to simply take a riot-prevention
Id. at 24.
Id. at 3.
122 See CARTER, supra note 106, at 173 (noting that the report was ultimately filed way
in an undated envelope, bearing the legend “Confidential Reports which we have
announced have never been prepared. Do not give out to anyone, or acknowledge we
have”); see also Ramsey Clark Oral History Interview III (Mar. 21, 1969), LBJ
Presidential
Library,
http//lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_histories/clark_r/clark-r3.pdf
(observing that “the report didn’t pull any punches; it demonstrated the existence of really
immensely difficult problems . . .; it was not tender in its treatment of many important
interests”).
123 See CLARK REPORT, supra note 108, at 56. (“The task of thinking of the minority
poor as a vital and important part of the national scene and treating them with the
dignity and decency they deserve as people—American people—must be mastered if we
are to succeed in dealing with the problems.”)
124 See CARTER, supra note 106, at 201–08.
120
121
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approach; he would have to deal directly with the violence and
destruction in the streets, and there really is not a gentle,
nonconfrontational way to contain a riot. Nevertheless, Clark remained
ever mindful of ensuring that the intensity of the government’s
response was limited only to that which was necessary. He understood
that the police could go too far in their efforts to calm the unrest, as
turned out to be the case in Detroit, where some described the official
response as “a riot of police against blacks.”125
While Clark was committed to curtailing deadly and destructive
conduct by protesters, he stressed the need for “very careful control.”126
When officers overreacted, inflicting unnecessary violence on Black
citizens, Clark responded by authorizing federal charges against them
for civil rights violations.127 Even when the available evidence was
insufficient to establish a charge beyond a reasonable doubt, he still
authorized such prosecutions. One notable example is the prosecution of
three police officers and one security guard in connection with the
torture and killing of three Black men in the Algiers Motel in Detroit.128
They were indicted and tried for conspiracy to injure others in “the free
exercise and enjoyment of their constitutional rights by inflicting
punishment [on them] by injury and death . . . without due process of
law.”129 Although the four men were ultimately acquitted, Clark was
satisfied with the message that he sent: the excessive use of force by
law enforcement to quell civil unrest would not be tolerated.130

125 SIDNEY FINE, VIOLENCE IN THE MODEL CITY: THE CAVANAUGH ADMINISTRATION,
RACE RELATIONS, AND THE DETROIT RIOTS OF 1967 195 (1989).
126 HAMPTON SIDES, HELLHOUND ON HIS TRAIL: THE STALKING OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUNT FOR HIS ASSASSIN 248 (2010).
127 See FINE, supra note 125, at 244.
128 See id. at 271–81.
129 Id. at 289; 4 in Motel Freed in Michigan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 1970),
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/02/26/archives/4-in-motel-trial-freed-in-michigan-policeand-a-guard-cleared-in-67.html.
130 Clark also authorized the prosecution of nine police officers in connection with the
so-called Orangeburg Massacre, in which South Carolina police opened fire on unarmed
Black students from South Carolina State University who were protesting their exclusion
from a local bowling alley. See JACK BASS & JACK NELSON, ORANGEBURG MASSACRE 65–
77, 180 (1970); see also Frank Beacham, Orangeburg, America’s Forgotten Tragedy, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 5, 1993), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-02-05-me-797story.html. Although this prosecution was likewise ultimately unsuccessful, Clark
observed afterward that “[f]rom a law enforcement standpoint, [the case] would have a
sobering effect.” BASS & NELSON, supra, at 101, 180. In other words, officers would think
twice before engaging in such conduct in the future. For an in-depth treatment of the
Orangeburg Massacre, see generally BASS & NELSON, supra.
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He remained true to this commitment throughout the balance of his
tenure as attorney general, authorizing other similar prosecutions,
usually for abusive conduct by police officers directed toward Black
citizens. It was Clark’s opinion that such actions by law enforcement
only served to generate resentment, anger, and increased unrest:
Police who act by force, violence, and cunning stamp the imprimatur
of the people on such practices, and leave those they seek to
subjugate with little alternative but to reply in kind. In this way, by
acting violently and criminally, the police are the cause of further
crime and violence.131

He issued an even more stinging indictment of overzealous law
enforcement in the aftermath of the police response to unrest in
Orangeburg, South Carolina in 1968, characterizing the officer’s actions
leveled at unarmed Black student protesters as the cause of the
violence—“The cause of the incident was police criminal acts; the
provocation for the incident was an absurd, provocative display of
force.”132 Clark went on to denounce the divisive role that politics
played in the tragedy that resulted in three deaths and numerous
injuries, with leaders seeking to cast the students as somehow
deserving of the strong official reaction. Clark darkly noted that “[f]ear,
anger, a sense of self-righteousness to justify hating began to be seen
clearly as successful politics.”133
Speaking of this sort of political posturing, Mayor Richard Daley
engaged in some of the most irresponsible and dangerous law-and-order
rhetoric in the build-up to the 1968 Democratic National Convention
(DNC) in Chicago. Following the assassination of Martin Luther King,
Jr. on April 4, 1968, the pain, anger, and frustration of Black Americans
ignited rioting throughout the nation in over 100 cities, including
Washington, D.C.134 In response to the rioting that had occurred in
Chicago, and in anticipation of civil unrest that was sure to accompany
the upcoming DNC in the form of anti-Vietnam War protests, Mayor
Daley publicly stated that police officers should have been ordered to

131 Ramsey Clark, Police That Serve Society, in THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY 5–6 (Robert
M. Hutchins, et al eds., 1972).
132 Beacham, supra note 130. See also BASS & NELSON, supra note 130.
133 Beacham, supra note 130.
134 See JOHN T. ELLIFF, CRIME, DISSENT, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT IN THE 1960’S 112 (1971); GEROLD FRANK, AN AMERICAN DEATH: THE TRUE
STORY OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE GREATEST MANHUNT
OF OUR TIME 120–21 (1972); SIDES, supra note 126, at 260.
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shoot looters to maim and arsonists to kill.135 Ramsey Clark promptly
issued a sharp rebuke of the mayor, condemning his incendiary words.
In a speech at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Clark
bluntly expressed his view on the topic of shooting looters:
A reverence for life is the sure way of reducing violent death. There
are few acts more likely to cause guerilla warfare in our cities and
division and hatred among our people than to encourage police to
shoot looters or other persons caught committing property crimes.
How many dead twelve-year-old boys will it take for us to learn this
simple lesson?136

In addition, Clark essentially threatened Daley with prosecution if any
looters were shot in connection with the DNC.137
Ultimately, there was no shooting of looters or killing of arsonists;
however, the Chicago police unleashed a brutal display of force against
the antiwar protesters. According to author Norman Mailer’s graphic
description,
The police attacked with tear gas, with Mace, and with clubs, they
attacked like a chainsaw cutting into wood, the teeth of the saw the
edge of their clubs, they attacked like a scythe through grass, lines of
20 and 30 policemen striking out in an arc, their clubs beating,
demonstrators fleeing.138

Ramsey Clark reacted strongly to the police violence, assigning the
brunt of the blame for the unrest to them, while refusing to denounce or
demonize the protesters. This was in stark contrast to Mayor Daley’s
assessment, which attributed the violence to “outside agitators” whose
sole purpose was to instigate a confrontation with law enforcement.139
Daley wanted the demonstrators prosecuted, as did President

135 MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE
CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S 155 (2005).
136 RICHARD HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER, AND FREEDOM IN AMERICA
17 (1970) (quoting Ramsey Clark).
137 Ramsey Clark, How Can You Represent that Man?: Ethics, the Rule of Law, and
Defending the Indefensible, 44 GA. L. REV. 921, 926 (2010).
138 FLAMM, supra note 135, at 157 (quoting NORMAN MAILER, MIAMI AND THE SIEGE OF
CHICAGO: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
CONVENTIONS OF 1968 (1969)). For a motion picture account of the clash between police
and protesters, as well as the famous criminal prosecutions that followed, see The Trial of
the Chicago 7 (Netflix 2020).
139
Bruce R. Ragsdale, The Chicago Seven: 1960s Radicalism in the
Federal Courts (2008), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/trials/chicago7.pdf.
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Johnson.140 Attorney General Clark, however, pressed for the
prosecution of the offending police officers, having no interest in
pursuing those whom he viewed as victims of the official violence.141
While eight police officers were eventually indicted, the prosecution
would not occur until after Ramsey Clark’s departure from the DOJ.
His successor John Mitchell would oversee this case, as well as the
more desirable prosecution—at least from Richard Nixon and Mitchell’s
perspectives—of the so-called Chicago Seven, the perceived leaders of
the demonstrations and instigators of the violence.142
Interestingly, Clark’s empathetic handling of the DNC-related
unrest, combined with his earlier measured responses to civil disorder,
became the principal target of Nixon’s successful campaign for the
presidency.143 Nixon and Independent Party Candidate George Wallace
ran on a law-and-order platform and promised to get rid of Clark, whom
they characterized as a soft-on-crime coddler of criminals. They blamed
Clark for the continuing unrest and assured the American public that,
if elected, they would crack down on those fomenting violence and
disruption.144 Even Democratic nominee Hubert Humphrey succumbed
to the law-and-order rhetoric and, as a part of his campaign, likewise
pledged to replace Ramsey Clark.145
Not surprisingly, Clark also had to endure the ire of Lyndon
Johnson. Johnson had long pressed for the prosecution of Black Power
activists Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, contending that they
were at the heart of the nationwide unrest.146 If Clark would just go
after them, then the rioting would stop, and LBJ could devote his full
attention to winning the war in Vietnam, which was his obsession.
There was even an entire Cabinet meeting devoted to the subject of
Carmichael and Brown’s prosecution.147 In the face of intense pressure
from the President and others within the administration, Ramsey Clark
persisted in refusing to indict either Black leader, ostensibly because

See HARRIS, supra note 136, at 69.
See DAVID J. LANGUM, WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER: THE MOST HATED LAWYER IN
AMERICA 103 (1999).
142 See HARRIS, supra note 136, at 69; Ragsdale, supra note 139.
143
See Peter Carlson, The Crusader, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2002),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/2002/12/15/the-crusader/9de49dd7-43fd45e0-a4ef-3df4475cb4a0/.
144 See HARRIS, supra note 136, at 144.
145 See id. at 172.
146 See BROWN, DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY, supra note 20, at 87‒89.
147 See id. at 88.
140
141
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the evidence was lacking.148 More likely, Clark simply believed that
such a prosecution was not the right thing to do; he almost certainly
viewed it as a misguided attempt to obfuscate the real problems that
needed to be addressed.
Clark’s resistance to political influences related to his handling of
civil unrest earned him an avalanche of criticism from the public,149 but
more so from political leaders. Despite this, Clark remained steadfast,
understanding the complexity of the underlying issues and recognizing
that the social rebellion occurring across the nation was a symptom to
be treated, not a disease to be eradicated. The law-and-order posturing
by politicians ignored this reality, and instead focused on demonizing
the protestors as lawless criminals who needed to be brought under
control through a powerful display of force and domination.150
In assessing the devastating societal effect that an unyielding lawand-order approach would have, Ramsey Clark presciently and
ominously observed:
How is [crime] controlled and reduced? . . . Not by exhortations to
“law and order,” which may mean many things but to most today
signify force, order as an end in itself, repressiveness. It nurtures
fear by conjuring terrible crimes. It fires anger by implying
authoritarian power. It divides black from white, young from old, rich
from poor, educated from ignorant . . . . It somehow calls for force to
prevent the act of crime while ignoring the heart prepared to commit
it.151

Clark exited the attorney general’s office in January of 1969, ceding
the position to Nixon’s choice for the job, John Mitchell, a man who fully
embraced the President’s desire for law and order.152 Hence, the
148 See id.; Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., A Tale of Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Ramsey Clark
and the Selective Non--Prosecution of Stokely Carmichael, 62 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2010).
149 See BROWN, DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY, supra note 20, at 74–75.
150 See, e.g., id. at 74, 110, 114.
151 HARRIS, supra note 136, at 29 (quoting Ramsey Clark).
152 See BROWN, DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY, supra note 20, at 78; see also John H.
Richardson, How the Attorney General of the United States Became Saddam Hussein’s
Lawyer, ESQUIRE (Feb. 1, 2007), https://archive.esquire.com/article/2007/1/1/how-theattorney-general-of-the-united-states-beacem-saddam-husseins-lawyer. Ironically, Nixon’s
law-and-order attorney general was later convicted and served prison time for conspiracy,
obstruction of justice, and lying under oath in endeavoring to cover up the Watergate
scandal. See Leslie Oelsner, Mitchell, Haldeman, Erlichman are Sentenced to 2 ½ to 8
Years, Mardian to 10 Months to 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Feb 22, 1975),
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/02/22/archives/mitchell-haldeman-ehrlichman-aresentenced-to-2-to-8-years-mardian.html.
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problems of unemployment, inferior education, and hostile
police-community relations that plagued Black Americans and
catalyzed much of the civil unrest would remain on the backburner,
making future rebellion all but inevitable.
C. William Barr and the Los Angeles Riots
Fast forward to March of 1991. Another violent encounter between
the police and a Black citizen, Rodney King, garnered national and
international attention. The conduct of the Los Angeles police officers
involved was as brutal as that depicted by Norman Mailer in Chicago
during the 1968 DNC,153 and it was captured on video for the world to
see. Notwithstanding this, the four offending officers were acquitted of
all charges on April 29, 1992.154 This verdict, coupled with the recent
lenient sentencing of a Korean convenience store owner who had shot
and killed an unarmed Black teenager, Latasha Harlins,155 resulted in
an almost immediate explosion of anger and violence in the streets of
Los Angeles.156 Eerily reminiscent of the Watts riots, there was burning
and looting, as well as sniper attacks on fire fighters and assaults on
any motorists who unluckily ventured into the area.157 The level of
unrest and destruction, however, greatly exceeded the riots of 1965.158
Local law enforcement was unprepared and overwhelmed. California
Governor Pete Wilson activated the National Guard and sought
assistance from the federal government. William Barr was President
George H.W. Bush’s attorney general at the time, and he initially
deployed the FBI and other federal agents to the area to aid in trying to
calm the violence. Later, as the unrest worsened, the President, at the
See supra text accompanying note 138.
See Anjuli Sarstry & Karen Grigsby Bates, When LA Erupted in Anger: A Look Back
at
the
Rodney
King
Riots,
NPR
(Apr.
26,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-back-at-therodney-king-riots.
155 See Court Refuses to Review Korean Grocer’s Sentence, WASH. POST (July
16, 1992), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/07/17/court-refuses-toreview-korean-grocers-sentence/
9956b135-4a3c-4c41-8b8b-799cd456686a/.
156 See Angel Jennings, How the Killing of Latasha Harlins Changed South L.A., Long
Before
Black
Lives
Matter,
L.A.
TIMES
(Mar.
18,
2016),
https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-0318-latasha-harlins-20160318-story.html.
157 See Sarstry & Bates, supra note 154.
158 See Daniel Bukszpan, America’s Most Destructive Riots of All Time, CNBC (Feb. 1,
2011),
https://www.cnbc.com/2011/02/01/Americas-Most-Destructive-Riots-of-AllTime.html (observing that the L.A. riots were the “costliest episode by far of civil unrest
in United States history.”).
153
154
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request of Governor Wilson and apparently on Barr’s advice, invoked
the “antiquated” Insurrection Act in order to make active-duty military
forces available.159 Marine and Army troops eventually arrived to assist
local law enforcement and the National Guard restore order. Not
trained to deal with such domestic disturbances, the military was less
than effective and overly heavy-handed in its efforts. Though the
violence ultimately dissipated, some viewed the federal soldiers as
playing a minimal and largely unnecessary role in this regard.160
Admittedly, the severity of the unrest was extreme, and much of the
violence and destruction could plausibly be viewed as purely criminal,
with no rational justification. As such, a strong government response
was warranted to restore peace and order to the area.161 However,
despite the egregious nature of the rioter’s conduct, it would be a
mistake to dismiss summarily the reality that undoubtedly contributed
to the outrage. As scholar Dr. Cornell West observed: “What we
witnessed in Los Angeles was a consequence of a lethal linkage of
economic decline, cultural decay, and political lethargy in American
life.”162 The Bush administration did not acknowledge or appreciate
such a possibility, and its reaction failed to manifest any semblance of
empathy toward those involved in the riots or any recognition of the
persistent inequitable circumstances that contributed to Black citizens’
rage and frustration. Instead, evocative of government leaders’
sentiment in the aftermath of civil unrest during the 60s,163 official
public commentary in 1992 condemned the demonstrators and denied
the existence of any legitimacy for their actions. President Bush said
the violence was “not about civil rights” or “the great issues of equality”

159 See Jim Newton, Did Bill Barr Learn the Wrong Lesson from the L.A.
Riots?, POLITICO (June 9, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/06/09/willi
am-barr-los-angeles-riots-307446; Natalie Ermann Russell, Riots in the City of Angels,
UVA MILLER CENTER, (Apr. 24, 2017), https://millercenter.org/riots-city-angels; see also
Alicia Victoria Lozano, The Insurrection Act was last used in the 1992 Los Angeles riots.
Invoking it again could undo years of police reform, some warn, NBC NEWS (June 4, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/insurrection-act-was-last-used-1992-los-angelesriots-invoking-n1224356 (noting that the Insurrection Act was last used during the 1992
L.A. riots).
160 See Newton, supra note 159.
161 See Lozano, supra note 159 (observing that by the time the Insurrection Act had
been invoked, twelve individuals were already dead and entire city blocks had been
“reduced to rubble.”).
162 CORNELL WEST, RACE MATTERS 1 (25th Anniv. ed. 2017).
163 See supra text accompanying notes 99‒106.
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but rather “the brutality of a mob, pure and simple.”164 In addition, he
maintained that “[t]he wanton destruction of life and property is not a
legitimate expression of outrage with injustice. It is itself injustice. And
no rationalization, no matter how heartfelt, no matter how eloquent,
can make it otherwise.”165
To be sure, like much of the nation, Bush was surprised and troubled
by the jury’s verdict and was committed to having his DOJ, led by
Attorney General Barr, investigate the police conduct at issue and
pursue federal charges if warranted.166 While Barr did proceed with the
investigation, which ultimately resulted in a grand jury indicting the
four officers,167 his public statements about the rioting principally
focused on harshly condemning the participants. His view was that the
violence in Los Angeles was mostly attributable to gang violence—“My
basic take was that this was not civil unrest or the product of some
festering injustice. This was gang activity, basically opportunistic.”168
Concordant with this perspective, Barr would later equate the actions of
the rioters with those of the police officers responsible for King’s
beating, suggesting that the rioters should have been subjected to
federal prosecution,169 like the officers.170

164 Paul Taylor & Carlos Sanchez, Bush Orders Troops into Los Angeles,
WASH. POST (May 2, 1992), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/05/02/b
ush-orders-troops-into-los-angeles/4c4711a6-f18c-41ed-b796-6a8a50d6120d/.
165 Maggie Astor & Zach Montague, Past Presidents Faced Police Brutality and
Protests.
They
Handled
It
Differently,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
3,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/politics/george-floyd-trump-obama-bushclinton.html.
166 See Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, The Ball is in Bush’s Court on Response to
L.A. Riots on Politics, BALT. SUN (May 5, 1992), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bsxpm-1992-05-05-1992126127-story.html.
167 The officers were indicted for violating Rodney King’s constitutional rights under
the fourth and fourteenth amendments. See Robert Reinhold, U.S. Jury Indicts 4 Police
Officers
in
King
Beating,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
6,
1992), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/98/02/08/home/rodneyindict.html. In April of 1993, Sergeant Stacey Coon and Officer Laurence Powell were
convicted, but the other two officers—Theodore Briseno and Timothy Wind—were
acquitted. See Rodney King Riot: Timeline of Key Events, AP NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://apnews.com/article/fa4d04d8281443fc8db0e27d6be52081.
168 Russell, supra note 159 (Barr contending that “the violence was largely street gang
activity, big-time gang, not like street gangs in the 1950s—Crips-type gangs”).
169 See David Rohde, William Barr, Trump’s Sword and Shield, NEW YORKER (Jan. 13,
2020) (“Unfortunately, we just brought the federal case against the cops and never
pursued the gangsters.”).
170 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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Barr’s reaction to the unrest in Los Angeles was consistent with two
of his principal goals for the DOJ, which were to address increasing
crime and gang violence.171 He was unwilling to accept that there was
any racial inequity in the administration of the criminal justice system.
Such arguments were unsupported excuses, in his mind, rather than
legitimate explanations. In particular, Barr stated that any disparity in
terms of the incarceration of Black versus white Americans was a
product of factors unrelated to race—“our system is fair and does not
treat people differently.”172 He went on to note:
if a black and a white are charged with the same offense, generally
they will get the same treatment in the system, and ultimately the
same penalty. There are some laws that may have a disparate impact
on minorities—laws that are not intentionally discriminatory, but as
a practical matter, impact minority populations more than others.173

An example of one such law that Barr gave was the mandatory
minimum sentence of five years for possessing five grams of crack
cocaine. To him, the fact that Black citizens were overwhelmingly the
recipients of such harsh sentences was a function of the letter of the
law, and not any sort of systemic racism, ignoring, of course, the
obvious possibility that perhaps the law itself was racially skewed by
design.174
In keeping with his strict law-and-order approach to criminal
justice, Barr was (and remains) a strong proponent of incarceration.
While still attorney general in 1992, he drafted a report in this regard
titled The Case for More Incarceration175 in which he is sharply critical
171 See Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments–William P. Barr: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 51 (1991) (statement of William P.
Barr),
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/ag-vacancy/1991-AG-Nomination-HearingTranscript.pdf (when stating his priorities, Barr listed “violent crime” and “attacking
criminal organizations, that is, gangs”).
172 Ronald J. Ostrow, William Barr: A “Caretaker” Attorney General Proves AgendaSetting Conservative, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 1992), https://www.latimes.com/archives/laxpm-1992-06-21-op-1236-story.html.
173 Id.
174 See id.
175 William P. Barr, The Case for More Incarceration (Oct. 18, 1992),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/139583NCJRS.pdf. See also Combatting
Violent Crime: 24 Recommendations to Strengthen Criminal Justice, Memorandum from
William P. Barr, U.S. Att’y Gen. on Recommendations for State Criminal Justice Systems
to George H.W. Bush, U.S. President (July 28, 1992) 19 (on file with the National
Criminal
Justice Reference System),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/137713NCJRS.pdf (noting that “[l]aw-abiding
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of political efforts in the 1960s to address crime through the
implementation of social policies rather than increased incarceration. In
his view, this strategy actually exacerbated the problem by expanding
the crime rate.176 Barr rather simplistically concluded that locking more
people up would invariably lead to a reduction in crime—violent crime
in particular.177 To the extent that this might lead to an overcrowding
problem, Barr had an easy remedy: build more prisons.178
Furthermore, as already noted, Barr denied that racial bias existed
against Black citizens in terms of incarceration, stating that: “The
charge that systemic racial discrimination results in disproportionate
incarceration of blacks and in longer sentences, a charge that is often
accompanied by misleading statistics, is simply not sustainable.”179
Indeed, he made the case—as he still does today—that the real problem
is Black-on-Black crime, and that increased incarceration would, in fact,
benefit the Black population more than any other racial group.180
It is important to observe here that Ramsey Clark’s views on crime
and incarceration could not have been more different. He firmly
believed that social conditions, such as poverty and racism, were the
“fountainheads of crime” and that the American prison system was
badly broken and unfairly skewed against Black citizens.181 Rather
than
increasing
incarceration,
Clark
favored
incentivizing
rehabilitation through the creative concept of indeterminate sentencing.
Under this model, sentences would be based on a range instead of
imposed as a specified length. Inmates who demonstrate sufficient
progress toward rehabilitation would be eligible for conditional or

citizens have a right to expect that those who have violated the law will not lead a life of
leisure in prison”).
176 See William P. Barr, The Case for More Incarceration 1‒2 (Oct. 18, 1992),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/139583NCJRS.pdf.
177 See id. at 5 (contending that “[i]t strains credulity to believe that the lowered crime
rates have been unrelated to the unprecedented increases in the nation’s incarceration
rates, even if there may have been other causes as well”).
178 See id. at 11.
179 See id. at app. B, B-1.
180 See id. at vi (“The benefits of increased incarceration would be enjoyed
disproportionately by black Americans living in inner cities, who are victims of violent
crime at far higher rates than white persons who live outside the inner cities”); id. at 20
(observing that “while increasing incarceration might result in higher numbers of black
men in prison (just as it would with white men), it would disproportionately benefit
innocent black victims of their crimes”) (emphasis in original).
181 RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA: OBSERVATIONS ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES,
PREVENTION AND CONTROL 17 (1970).
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unconditional release.182 From Clark’s perspective this type of
opportunity would have provided prisoners with a sense of hope and
would create an atmosphere more conducive to rehabilitation. Without
this, according to Clark, incarceration only serves to produce more
crime.183
William Barr’s tough-on-crime mindset was on full display in his
response to the L.A. riots of 1992, and his words and actions seemed
wholly in sync with those of President Bush. He would get another
opportunity to address similar social disorder in 2020. How would he
respond this time?
D. William Barr and the George Floyd Protests
George Floyd, suspected of having committed a minor, nonviolent
crime, ended up dying beneath the casual knee of a Minneapolis police
officer, Derek Chauvin. With a hand in his pocket and sunglasses
pushed back atop his head, Chauvin ignored Floyd’s desperate
indication that he could not breathe.184 It was obvious that Chauvin was
killing George Floyd, and perhaps even more patent that he did not
seem to care. When word and video images of this horrifying incident
spread across Minneapolis and beyond, the shock and outrage was
immediate and understandable, especially with Floyd’s death closely
succeeding troubling killings of Black Americans—Breonna Taylor in
Kentucky and Ahmaud Arbery in Georgia.185
President Trump initially reacted in a manner that seemed
appropriate in light of the tragic and highly disturbing nature of Floyd’s
killing. Although he stopped short of condemning the police directly, the
President acknowledged that what he saw was “very bad”; he indicated
that the FBI and attorney general were going to “take a very strong
look and see what went on”; and he extended his remorse to “George’s

Id. at 222.
See BROWN, DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY, supra note 20, at 229. For a contrary
view,
see
William
P.
Barr,
The
Case
for
More
Incarceration
9‒11
(Oct. 18, 1992), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/139583NCJRS.pdf
(arguing
that prisons do not create crime).
184 See David K. Li, George Floyd Told Police He was Struggling to Breathe Before an
Officer
Put
a
Knee
on
His
Neck,
NBC
NEWS
(May
29,
2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/george-floyd-told-police-he-was-strugglingbreathe-officer-put-n1218556.
185 See Lauren Aratani, George Floyd Killing: What Sparked the Protests – and What
has been the Response?, THE GUARDIAN (May 29, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/may/29/george-floyd-killing-protests-police-brutality.
182
183

824

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72

family and friends.”186 As time went on, however, the protests in
Minneapolis, and elsewhere, intensified, and so did the content and
tone of the President’s official rhetoric. Reminiscent of Mayor Daley in
1968,187 President Trump tweeted:
These THUGS are dishonoring the memory of George Floyd, and I
won’t let that happen. Just spoke to Governor Tim Walz and told him
that the Military is with him all the way. Any difficulty and we will
assume control but, when the looting starts, the shooting starts.188

Trump subsequently tried to recast his tweet by explaining that the
reference to shooting looters was really only meant to point out a
natural consequence of looting; it was not a threat regarding what
authorities would or should do to looters.189 Given the overall content of
the tweet, particularly the “THUGS” reference, it is difficult to accept
the President’s after-the-fact rationale. It seems apparent that he was
warning protesters that if looting started, such actions would be met
with deadly force.
Although he was not as overt as Mayor Daley, President Trump’s
message was essentially the same. However, in 1968, Daley’s
irresponsible grandstanding was met head on with an official rebuke
from the nation’s chief law enforcement official, Ramsey Clark, who
made it clear that lethal force should not and would not be used in
response to acts creating property damage.190 In 2020, Attorney General
William Barr made no such public statement.191 Perhaps he felt that
the President’s post-hoc explanation was sufficient, but even so, it
would have been reassuring for the attorney general, at a minimum, to
have publicly clarified that the level of force suggested in the
President’s tweet would not be appropriate for property-related
offenses, or some statement to that effect. After all, grossly over-the-top
police aggression is what precipitated the unrest in the first place.
Astor & Montague, supra note 165.
See supra text accompanying note 135.
188 Astor & Montague, supra note 165.
189 See id.
190 See supra text accompanying note 136.
191 It is important to note that on at least one occasion, Barr complained about the
President’s tweets, lamenting that they made it impossible for him to do his job. See Matt
Zapotosky & Josh Dawsey, et al., Barr Has Told Those Close to Trump He is Considering
Quitting Over the President’s Tweets About Justice Department Investigations, WASH.
POST (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raises-possibility-ofsuing-those-involved-in-prosecuting-roger-stone/2020/02/18/238279fc-5250-11ea-9e4759804be1dcfb_story.html.
186
187
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This is but one example of Attorney General Barr’s silence in relation
to the President’s words or actions regarding civil unrest or to other
disturbing events that occurred on his watch. It is of course possible,
that though publicly silent, the attorney general was working behind
the scenes to address issues in an appropriate manner. However, Barr
is by no means one who makes a practice of remaining silent and letting
his actions speak for themselves. As attorney general, he often spoke
out, emphatically at times, making it noteworthy and revealing to
examine the matters on which Barr issued public statements as
compared to those on which he held his tongue.
Notably, Attorney General Barr was quite vocal with regard to his
official views related to the protests following the George Floyd killing.
Unlike Ramsey Clark, but much like his earlier commentary on the L.A.
riots, Barr condemned the actions of the protesters and suggested that
they were being led and turned violent by subversive elements. In a
prepared statement, he maintained that “voices of peaceful protest
[were] being hijacked by violent radical elements” and that “[g]roups of
outside radicals and agitators [were] exploiting the situation to pursue
their own separate and violent agenda.”192 Furthermore, he went on to
suggest that “[i]n many places it appear[ed] the violence [was] planned,
organized, and driven by anarchistic and far-left extremists, using
Antifa-like tactics, many of whom travel[ed] from out of state to
promote the violence.”193 He ended by threatening prosecution,
emphasizing that it is a federal crime to cross state lines or use
interstate facilities to incite or participate in violent rioting, and
proclaiming that: “We will enforce these laws,”194 and later heightened
his condemnation of such actors, characterizing them as “domestic
terrorists.”195 It is important to note that while Barr spent much time
focusing on the alleged involvement of these violent extremists, in
reality, the protests were largely peaceful.196 Hence, this incantation of

Barr’s Statement on the Death of George Floyd, supra note 14.
Id.
194 Id. Ironically, the Act that contains these prohibitions is known as the “Rap Brown
law,” because it was enacted to address the behavior that Rap Brown and Stokely
Carmichael were allegedly engaged in during the 60s, the conduct that Ramsey Clark
refused to deem as criminal. See supra notes 146‒47 and accompanying text.
195 Barr’s Statement on Riots, supra note 14.
196 See Lozano, supra note 159; see also Barr’s Remarks on Civil Unrest, supra note 16
(acknowledging that the “large preponderance” of protesters were peaceful, but
nevertheless focused attention principally on those he characterized as “extremist
agitators who are hijacking the protests”).
192
193
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civil unrest was clearly unlike the violence that Barr faced in 1992.197
Nevertheless, his reaction was much the same.
Barr persisted in demonizing protesters even after the
demonstrations slowed. For example, in an appearance at Hillsdale
College, he tersely criticized the Black Lives Matter Movement,
asserting that its followers are not interested in Black lives but rather
“in props, a small number of Blacks who are killed by police during
conflicts with police . . . who they can use as props to achieve a much
broader political agenda.”198 During the same appearance, Barr decried
the COVID-19 lockdowns as the “greatest intrusion on civil liberties in
American history,” other than slavery.199 Barr’s ignoring of such historic
civil liberties deprivations as legalized segregation, the Japanese
internment during World War II, and the institutionalized withholding
of Black citizens’ right to vote, among others, was astonishing.
In terms of his critique of law enforcement following George Floyd’s
death, Barr was reluctant to criticize the police, despite widespread
calls for dramatic reform, and he insisted that there is no systemic
racism in policing.200 Although he unavoidably conceded that there are
some officers who may be racially biased, he refused to acknowledge
that the system as a whole may have a racial-bias problem—“I think
that there are instances of bad cops. And I think we have to be careful

197 See Lozano, supra note 159 (noting that the circumstances surrounding the 1992
Los Angeles riots differed greatly from those of the George Floyd-related protests—they
“weren’t the peaceful protests seen recently throughout the country and around the
world”).
198 Carrie Johnson, Barr Blasts His Own Prosecutors: “All Power is Vested in the
Attorney General”, NPR (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/17/913891515/infiery-speech-barr-assails-his-own-prosecutors-for-political-headhunting. See also Debra
Cassens Weiss, AG Barr Defends Authority to Overrule Career Prosecutors, Says BLM
Uses Deaths as “Props”, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 17, 2020) (observing that “Barr has urged
aggressive prosecution of protesters who are violent, reportedly telling
prosecutors . . . they should consider charging [the protesters] with sedition”).
199 Johnson, supra note 198.
200 See Katie Benner, Barr Says There Is No Systemic Racism in Policing, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/us/politics/justice-department-barrracism-police.html; see also Interview by Margaret Brennan with William Barr, U.S. Att'y
Gen., CBS NEWS (June 7, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bill-barr-george-floydprotests-blm-face-the-nation-transcript/ (Barr stating “I think there is racism in the
United States still but I don’t think that the law enforcement system is systemically
racist”).
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about automatically assuming that the actions of an individual
necessarily mean that their organization is rotten.”201
In Barr’s view, the police actually seem to be the victims.
Commenting on the public reaction to George Floyd, he stated:
We had that terrible death in Minneapolis . . . , but then we had this
extreme reaction that has demonized police and called for the
defunding of police departments. And what we have seen then is a
significant increase in violent crime in many cities. And this rise is a
direct result of the attack on the police forces and the weakening of
police forces.202

Along the same lines, in testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee, he contended that the “demonization of the police is not
only unfair and inconsistent with the principle that all people should be
treated as individuals, but gravely injurious to our inner city
communities . . . . When a community turns on and pillories its own
police, officers naturally become more risk averse and crime rates
soar.”203 Barr went on to proclaim that the “threat to black lives posed
by crime on the streets is massively greater than any threat posed by
police misconduct.”204
While Barr was willing to speak out about the George Floyd-related
protests, largely by condemning the protesters and defending law
enforcement, he stood by silently in the face of numerous other
troubling instances of civil disorder. For example, when anti-lockdown
protesters, many with firearms, violently stormed government
buildings, including the Michigan statehouse,205 Attorney General Barr

201 See Interview by Margaret Brennan with William Barr, U.S. Att’y Gen., CBS NEWS
(June 7, 2020) (“I frankly think that we have generally the vast, overwhelming majority of
police are good people”) (quoting Barr).
202 Rebecca Klar, Barr: Floyd's Death was “Terrible,” But the Reaction to It Has Been
HILL
(July
22,
2020),
“Extreme,”
THE
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/508594-barr-floyds-death-was-terrible-butthe-reaction-to-it-has-been.
203 William P. Barr, Written Statement, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
(July
28,
2020),
available
at
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/509304-read-attorney-general-williambarrs-written-testimony-to-the-house.
204 Id. Cf. supra note 180 and accompanying text.
205 See Katie Shepherd & Moriah Balingit, A Noose, an Axe, and Trump-Inspired
Insults: Anti-Lockdown Protesters Rachet Up Violent Rhetoric, WASH. POST (May 15,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2020/05/15/noose-fight-coronavirus-protest/.
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apparently had nothing to say by way of condemnation.206 On August
23, 2020, a Kenosha, Wisconsin police officer shot Jacob Blake seven
times in the back during an encounter, leaving Blake paralyzed and
igniting civil unrest in Wisconsin and across the country.207 In response,
Barr had no condemning words for the facially excessive display of
official force, but rather, spoke out cryptically in defense of the officer,
suggesting that he knew additional facts that he would not reveal and
stating that the case was an example of “when people should wait until
they know the facts” before they “crucify the officer.”208
One final dichotomy in terms of how Attorney General Barr chose to
address different forms of civil unrest seems especially revealing. On
June 4, 2020, a diverse crowd of demonstrators in Lafayette Square
near the White House, who were protesting police mistreatment of
Black Americans, were forcibly “pushed back” after they purportedly
refused to disperse and were becoming unruly.209 Barr gave the orders
to the police and federal forces to clear the area, using shields,
nightsticks, and pepper spray.210 Once accomplished, the President was
able to take advantage of a photo opportunity holding a Bible in front of
St. John’s Episcopal Church.211

206 See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing on Att’y Gen. William Barr (Jul. 28, 2020),
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/house-judiciary-committee-hearing-of-attorneygeneral-barr-transcript-july-28 (exchange between Barr and Representatives Jamie
Raskin and Pramila Jayapal, during which Barr acknowledged this awareness of the
protests but not their gravity and suggested that it was a matter for the “Michigan
authorities.”).
207 See Christina Morales, What We Know About the Shooting of Jacob Blake, N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/jacob-blake-shootingkenosha.html.
208 Interview by Pete Williams with William Barr, NBC NEWS (Sept. 10,
2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/video/watch-full-a-g-william-barr-interview91387461997.
209 Matthew S. Schwartz, Security Perimeter Around White House Expanded by Several
Blocks, NPR (June 5, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racialjustice/2020/06/05/870760404/security-perimeter-around-white-house-expanded-byseveral-blocks.
210 See Interview by Margaret Brennan with William Barr, U.S. Att'y Gen., CBS News
(June 7, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bill-barr-george-floyd-protests-blm-facethe-nation-transcript/ (Barr defending methods used, calling them “appropriate . . . when
they met resistance”); Phillip Bump, Attorney General Barr's Dishonest Defense of the
(June
8,
2020),
Clearing
Defense
of
LaFayette
Square,
WASH. POST
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/08/attorney-general-barrs-dishonestdefense-clearing-lafayette-square/; (noting Barr’s defense of the use of pepper spray by
explaining that it is not a chemical but rather a strong irritant).
211 Bump, supra note 210.
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In contrast, on October 31, a small group of white protesters carrying
Trump signs outside of Barr’s residence in McLean, Virginia were
personally greeted by the attorney general. He spoke with them,
explained the DOJ’s role, shook their hands, and posed for pictures.212
The protesters were treated with dignity and respect, notwithstanding
that they were trespassing and issuing demands for Barr to lock up Joe
Biden. No police were called. No nightsticks. No pepper spray.
The lack of consistency between the attorney general’s actions and
choices regarding when to speak out publicly conveyed a message,
intended or not, that was loud and clear. Statements and actions that
were in sync with the President’s politically expedient law-and-order
rhetoric and campaign-related messaging were not merely accepted but
embraced; while those actors who might somehow have been portrayed
as opposed to the law-and-order platform, or otherwise outside the
President’s political mainstream, were criticized, marginalized, and
maybe even subjected to physical force.
Attorney General Barr’s silence and inaction spoke louder than
words. They signified that justice is not equal, all lives are not the
same, and DOJ independence is an ideal to be verbally deployed when
advantageous but not necessarily an objective that defined how the
attorney general carried out his role.213
V. CONCLUSION: RAMSEY CLARK OR WILLIAM BARR?
As attorneys general go, Ramsey Clark and William Barr were
about as different as two men could be. However, despite their many
differences, they both shared a common respect and admiration for the
212 See Matthew Brown, Pro-Trump Protesters Picket Attorney General Barr's House in
Virginia, Demand He “Lock Up” Joe Biden, USA TODAY (Nov. 1, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/
2020/11/01/protesters-william-barrs-virginia-home-demand-joe-biden-arrest/6112424002/.
213 It should be noted that in the aftermath of President Trump’s election loss to Joe
Biden, he and his attorney general ultimately parted ways on the subject of alleged
widespread voter fraud. Although Barr had fueled speculation regarding the potential for
voter fraud in the lead-up to the election, the absence of actual evidence to support
plausible claims that substantial voter fraud in fact occurred caused the attorney general
to publicly disagree with the President and eventually resign. See Katie Benner &
Michael S. Schmidt, Barr Acknowledges Justice Department Has Found No Widespread
Voter
Fraud,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
1,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/01/us/politics/william-barr-voter-fraud.html. But even
in resigning, Barr glowingly praised Trump, thereby undermining the significance of the
voter-fraud schism. See Norman Eisen & Donald Ayer, William Barr’s Resignation is a
Final, Parting Shot to the Rule of Law, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/12/15/barr-resignation-rule-law/.
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job of law enforcement. It may come as a surprise that Attorney
General Clark was actually quite popular with the police during the
60s. This is so because, notwithstanding his harsh denouncement of
individual instances of police abuse and systemic racial insensitivity, he
believed that a partial answer to these problems was to improve the
quality of the officers through enhanced training and better pay.214
Hence, my guess is that Clark, like Barr, would not support the “defund
the police” movement, at least not during his time as attorney general.
Another area where one might conclude that Clark and Barr agreed
is with regard to their views on the importance of independence in
executing the duties of the attorney general, particularly the
prosecutorial function. For his part, Clark’s actions speak for
themselves. He defied President Johnson on numerous significant
matters, to the point of permanently damaging the men’s personal and
working relationship. The integrity of the office and the rule of law
came first for Clark, and that priority could only be maintained, if he
exercised independent professional judgment in this area, devoid of any
and all political influence.
As for Attorney General Barr, he certainly talked a good game,
expressing a commitment to all of the things that Ramsey Clark, in
fact, did as attorney general. Specifically, as already noted, during his
confirmation hearing in 2019, Barr emphasized his ability to be “truly
independent” and maintained that he could not be bullied into doing
anything that he thinks is wrong. He pledged that he would do what he
thinks is right as attorney general. Further, he hearkened back to his
previous confirmation hearing in 1991, and again emphasized, as he did
then, that the “Attorney General . . . holds in trust the fair and
impartial administration of justice.”215 In accord with this, Barr
represented that he would “ensure that the administration of justice,
the enforcement of the law, is above and away from politics. Nothing
could be more destructive of our system of Government, of the rule of
law, or the Department of Justice as an institution, than any toleration
of political interference with the enforcement of the law. I believe this
as strongly today as I did 27 years ago, indeed, more strongly.”216

See BROWN, DEFENDING THE PUBLIC’S ENEMY, supra note 20, at 112‒14.
Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearing on Hon. William Barr to be Att’y Gen. William
Barr (Jan. 15 2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/CHRG-116shrg36846/CHRG116shrg36846.htm.
216 Id. See also Interview by Pierre Thomas with William Barr, U.S. Att'y Gen., ABC
News (Feb. 13, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-attorney-general-billbarrs-exclusive-interview-abc/story?id=68975178 (Barr stating that “the essential role of
214
215
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In February of 2020 William Barr asserted that the President had
never asked him to do anything in a criminal case.217 Even then, this
statement rang somewhat hollow, and it was unclear whether it
included Trump asking Barr to initiate prosecutions or was simply
limited to the President intervening in pending cases. Maybe the
attorney general was acting in a truly independent fashion, “above and
away from politics,” but the timing of some of his official acts in relation
to presidential tweets, at least created the appearance that he may
have been doing the President’s bidding.218
Whatever plausibility there may have been regarding Barr’s
February pronouncement seems to have dissipated considerably by the
fall. In October, the President did not simply ask his attorney general to
take action in criminal cases, he all but directed him to do so, calling
Barr out publicly for failing to indict President Barack Obama and Joe
Biden.219 In an interview on Fox Business, Trump lamented: “Unless
Bill Barr indicts these people for crimes—the greatest political crime in
the history of our country—then we’ll get little satisfaction, unless I
win.”220 Of course this was outrageous—a sitting President demanding

the Attorney General is to keep law enforcement [and] the criminal process sacrosanct to
make sure there is no political interference”).
217 David E. Sanger, Taking Page from Authoritarians, Trump Turns Power of State
Against
Political
Rivals,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/10/us/politics/trump-barr-pompeo.html (noting Barr’s
February statement to ABC News that Trump “has never asked me to do anything in a
criminal case”).
218 See, e.g., Zapotosky & Dawsey, et al., supra note 190 (noting that after Trump
tweeted about the unfairness of Roger Stone’s sentencing recommendation, Barr
intervened to reduce that recommendation, although he contends his decision was made
independently); see also Open Letter Supporting the 100,000 Lawyers, Agents, and Staff
Members
of
the
U.S.
Department
of
Justice
(Oct.
1,
2020),
https://lawyersdefendingdemocracy.org/open-letter-supporting-the-us-doj/
(contending
that “Barr’s prosecutorial actions supporting the President’s friends and partisan
interests [e.g., Roger Stone and Michael Flynn] have eroded confidence in his commitment
to impartial justice for all people”); Roiphe, supra note 75, at 1128 (discussing Barr’s
efforts related to Stone’s sentencing and the criticism he received for it from 2,000 former
members of the DOJ).
219 See id. (recounting tweet by Trump in which he demanded that Barr “immediately
arrest and jail” President Obama, Joe Biden, and Hillary Clinton).
220 Sanger, supra note 217. See also Andrew Desiderio, Trump Hits Barr for not
(Oct.
9,
2020),
Delivering
Russia
Probe
Bombshells,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/09/trump-hits-barr-russia-probe-bombshells428355 (noting that Trump reacted to news that indictments related to the Russia probe
investigation would not occur before the election by stating “[i]f that’s the case, I’m very
disappointed. I think it’s a terrible thing. And I’ll say it to [Barr’s] face”).
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that his predecessor and a political opponent be indicted before an
upcoming election for the obvious purpose of influencing the outcome.
If Ramsey Clark were the attorney general, it seems difficult to
conclude that he would not have felt compelled to have said something
in response to such extreme remarks by the President. My educated
speculation is that he would not have been comfortable allowing the
integrity and independence of his position to be called into question. It
was important to him that the American people believe in the fairness
and justness of the system, and that they have faith in the rule of law.
Clark’s empathic and integrity-laden handling of civil unrest in the 60s
revealed how he viewed his responsibility as attorney general. His
ultimate responsibility was to the United States and its citizens, not the
President. Accordingly, just as he stood firm against President Johnson,
he would almost certainly have done likewise with respect to President
Trump and would have resigned if pressured to do something that was
contrary to his sacred duty.
One would have hoped that William Barr would have responded in a
similar fashion, but as this Article demonstrates, the fact that he failed
to speak out should come as no real surprise. While his silence may
have been designed to simply let the issue fade into the background,221
such reticence creates a problem when considered against the backdrop
of matters on which Barr chose to speak—like the illegitimacy of the
Black Lives Matter Movement, or the need for increased incarceration,
or his position that there is no systemic racism in policing. What he
chose to talk about and what he determined to have been unworthy of
comment telegraphed to the public the priorities of the Trump DOJ and
the substance of the person at its head. Although he would surely claim
otherwise, a persuasive case can be made that Attorney General Barr
considered himself to be the President’s lawyer and acted, almost
invariably in a manner consistent with his perceived client’s political
objectives.
Fairly early in his presidency, when he was reeling from attacks
about the alleged Russian interference in his 2016 election, and
Attorney General Jeff Sessions and FBI Director James Comey seemed
unwilling to protect him with fierce, blind loyalty, President Trump

221 It should be noted that no indictment of President Obama or now-President Biden
was issued before or after the election. One could argue that this was answer enough to
the President’s comments, but there is still something troubling about Barr’s silence when
assessed in the context of his overall actions and other public statements.
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longingly and rhetorically asked: “Where’s my Roy Cohn?”222 Cohn had
been a legal advisor for Senator Joseph McCarthy during his search for
communists in the 1950s and the personal lawyer and fixer to a host of
high-profile clients, such as Yankee owner George Steinbrenner,
organized crime boss John Gotti, and, most notably, Donald Trump,
with whom Cohn developed a close relationship.223 Cohn, who died in
1986, would do whatever it took to serve his client’s desires. He was
ruthless, relentless, and unfailingly loyal. 224 That is what Donald
Trump wanted, but that is not what the American people needed.
Rather than asking “where’s my Roy Cohn,” a President who truly
cared about our justice system and the sanctity of the rule of law would
have been better served to ask, “where’s my Ramsey Clark?”

222 See Ron Elving, President Trump Called for Roy Cohn, But Roy Cohn Was Gone,
NPR (Jan 7, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/07/576209428/president-trump-called-forroy-cohn-but-roy-cohn-was-gone.
223 See id. See also Where’s My Roy Cohn (Altimeter Films 2019).
224 See Elving, supra note 222 (“If he was your lawyer, he was prepared to do anything
for you; if he was your adversary, no holds were barred.”). See generally Where’s My Roy
Cohn, supra note 223.

